I came upon the Curry-Howard Isomorphism relatively late in my programming life, and perhaps this contributes to my being utterly fascinated by it. It implies that for every programming concept there exists a precise analogue in formal logic, and vice versa. Here's a "basic" list of such analogies, off the top of my head:
program/definition | proof
type/declaration | proposition
inhabited type | theorem/lemma
function | implication
function argument | hypothesis/antecedent
function result | conclusion/consequent
function application | modus ponens
recursion | induction
identity function | tautology
non-terminating function | absurdity/contradiction
tuple | conjunction (and)
disjoint union | disjunction (or) -- corrected by Antal S-Z
parametric polymorphism | universal quantification
So, to my question: what are some of the more interesting/obscure implications of this isomorphism? I'm no logician so I'm sure I've only scratched the surface with this list.
For example, here are some programming notions for which I'm unaware of pithy names in logic:
currying | "((a & b) => c) iff (a => (b => c))"
scope | "known theory + hypotheses"
And here are some logical concepts which I haven't quite pinned down in programming terms:
primitive type? | axiom
set of valid programs? | theory
Edit:
Here are some more equivalences collected from the responses:
function composition | syllogism -- from Apocalisp
continuation-passing | double negation -- from camccann
Since you explicitly asked for the most interesting and obscure ones:
You can extend C-H to many interesting logics and formulations of logics to obtain a really wide variety of correspondences. Here I've tried to focus on some of the more interesting ones rather than on the obscure, plus a couple of fundamental ones that haven't come up yet.
evaluation | proof normalisation/cut-elimination
variable | assumption
S K combinators | axiomatic formulation of logic
pattern matching | left-sequent rules
subtyping | implicit entailment (not reflected in expressions)
intersection types | implicit conjunction
union types | implicit disjunction
open code | temporal next
closed code | necessity
effects | possibility
reachable state | possible world
monadic metalanguage | lax logic
non-termination | truth in an unobservable possible world
distributed programs | modal logic S5/Hybrid logic
meta variables | modal assumptions
explicit substitutions | contextual modal necessity
pi-calculus | linear logic
EDIT: A reference I'd recommend to anyone interested in learning more about extensions of C-H:
"A Judgmental Reconstruction of Modal Logic" http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~fp/papers/mscs00.pdf - this is a great place to start because it starts from first principles and much of it is aimed to be accessible to non-logicians/language theorists. (I'm the second author though, so I'm biased.)
You're muddying things a little bit regarding nontermination. Falsity is represented by uninhabited types, which by definition can't be non-terminating because there's nothing of that type to evaluate in the first place.
Non-termination represents contradiction--an inconsistent logic. An inconsistent logic will of course allow you to prove anything, including falsity, however.
Ignoring inconsistencies, type systems typically correspond to an intuitionistic logic, and are by necessity constructivist, which means certain pieces of classical logic can't be expressed directly, if at all. On the other hand this is useful, because if a type is a valid constructive proof, then a term of that type is a means of constructing whatever you've proven the existence of.
A major feature of the constructivist flavor is that double negation is not equivalent to non-negation. In fact, negation is rarely a primitive in a type system, so instead we can represent it as implying falsehood, e.g., not P
becomes P -> Falsity
. Double negation would thus be a function with type (P -> Falsity) -> Falsity
, which clearly is not equivalent to something of just type P
.
However, there's an interesting twist on this! In a language with parametric polymorphism, type variables range over all possible types, including uninhabited ones, so a fully polymorphic type such as ∀a. a
is, in some sense, almost-false. So what if we write double almost-negation by using polymorphism? We get a type that looks like this: ∀a. (P -> a) -> a
. Is that equivalent to something of type P
? Indeed it is, merely apply it to the identity function.
But what's the point? Why write a type like that? Does it mean anything in programming terms? Well, you can think of it as a function that already has something of type P
somewhere, and needs you to give it a function that takes P
as an argument, with the whole thing being polymorphic in the final result type. In a sense, it represents a suspended computation, waiting for the rest to be provided. In this sense, these suspended computations can be composed together, passed around, invoked, whatever. This should begin to sound familiar to fans of some languages, like Scheme or Ruby--because what it means is that double-negation corresponds to continuation-passing style, and in fact the type I gave above is exactly the continuation monad in Haskell.
Your chart is not quite right; in many cases you have confused types with terms.
function type implication
function proof of implication
function argument proof of hypothesis
function result proof of conclusion
function application RULE modus ponens
recursion n/a [1]
structural induction fold (foldr for lists)
mathematical induction fold for naturals (data N = Z | S N)
identity function proof of A -> A, for all A
non-terminating function n/a [2]
tuple normal proof of conjunction
sum disjunction
n/a [3] first-order universal quantification
parametric polymorphism second-order universal quantification
currying (A,B) -> C -||- A -> (B -> C), for all A,B,C
primitive type axiom
types of typeable terms theory
function composition syllogism
substitution cut rule
value normal proof
[1] The logic for a Turing-complete functional language is inconsistent. Recursion has no correspondence in consistent theories. In an inconsistent logic/unsound proof theory you could call it a rule which causes inconsistency/unsoundness.
[2] Again, this is a consequence of completeness. This would be a proof of an anti-theorem if the logic were consistent -- thus, it can't exist.
[3] Doesn't exist in functional languages, since they elide first-order logical features: all quantification and parametrization is done over formulae. If you had first-order features, there would be a kind other than *
, * -> *
, etc.; the kind of elements of the domain of discourse. For example, in Father(X,Y) :- Parent(X,Y), Male(X)
, X
and Y
range over the domain of discourse (call it Dom
), and Male :: Dom -> *
.
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