I came across this code showing format string exploitation while reading this article.
#include <stdio.h>
int main(void)
{
char secret[]="hack.se is lame";
char buffer[512];
char target[512];
printf("secret = %pn",&secret);
fgets(buffer,512,stdin);
snprintf(target,512,buffer);
printf("%s",target);
}
Executing it with following input
[root@knark]$ ./a.out
secret = 0xbffffc68
AAAA%x %x %x %x %x %x %x //Input given
AAAA4013fe20 0 0 0 41414141 33313034 30326566
- [root@knark]$
What I understand till now is the sequence of %x
's will keep on printing the values at addresses above current %esp
(I'm assuming that stack is growing downwards towards lower address).
What I'm unable to understand is the input given is stored in buffer
array which can't be less than 512 bytes away from current %esp
. So, how can the output contain 41414141
(the hex representation of AAAA
) just after the 4 %x
, i.e, just above the 4 addresses of current %esp
. I tried hard to stare at assembly code too but I think I couldn't follow the manipulation of strings on stack.
A format string vulnerability is a bug where user input is passed as the format argument to printf , scanf , or another function in that family. The format argument has many different specifies which could allow an attacker to leak data if they control the format argument to printf .
This could lead to overwriting sensitive variables such as passwords and username of the program and lead to a complete compromise. Attackers can also make use of this vulnerability to perform arbitrary writes in the dtors table of the program and make the program execute malicious code.
The attack could be executed when the application doesn't properly validate the submitted input. In this case, if a Format String parameter, like %x, is inserted into the posted data, the string is parsed by the Format Function, and the conversion specified in the parameters is executed.
A Format String error occurs when the submitted data of an input string is evaluated as a command by the application.
On entry to snprintf
, the stack has the following:
0xbfd257d0: 0xxxxxxxxx 0xxxxxxxxx 0xxxxxxxxx 0x080484d5
0xbfd257e0: 0xbfd25800 0x00000200 0xbfd25a00 0x00000000
0xbfd257f0: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0xbfd25800: 0x00000000 0x00000040 0xb7f22f2c 0x00000000
0xbfd25810: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0xbfd25800 -> target (initially 0x00000000 0x00000040 ...)
... -> garbage
0xbfd257e8 -> pointer to buffer
0xbfd257e4 -> 512
0xbfd257e0 -> pointer to target
0xbfd257df -> return address
target
gets overwritten with the result of snprintf
before snprintf
gets to use its words as arguments: It first writes "AAAA" (0x41414141) at 0xbfd25800, then "%x" reads the value at 0xbfd257ec and writes it at 0xbfd25804, ..., then "%x" reads the value at 0xbfd25800 (0x41414141) and writes it at 0xbfd25814, ...
First of all, let's have a look at the stack after calling snprintf():
Reading symbols from /home/blackbear/a.out...done.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/blackbear/a.out
secret = 0xbffff40c
ABCDEF%x %x %x %x %x %x %x
Breakpoint 1, main () at prova.c:13
13 printf("%s",target);
(gdb) x/20x $esp
0xbfffeff0: 0xbffff00c 0x00000200 0xbffff20c 0x00155d7c
0xbffff000: 0x00155d7c 0x000000f0 0x000000f0 0x44434241
0xbffff010: 0x35314645 0x63376435 0x35353120 0x20633764
0xbffff020: 0x66203066 0x34342030 0x32343334 0x33203134
0xbffff030: 0x34313335 0x20353436 0x37333336 0x35333436
(gdb)
We can actually see, at 0xbffff00c, the string already formatted, so sprintf() wrote right there. We can also see, at 0xbfffeff0, the last argument for snprintf(): target's address, which is actually 0xbffff00c. So I can deduce that strings are saved from the end to the beginning of their allocated space on the stack, as we can also see adding a strcpy():
blackbear@blackbear-laptop:~$ cat prova.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(void)
{
char secret[]="hack.se is lame";
char buffer[512];
char target[512];
printf("secret = %p\n", &secret);
strcpy(target, "ABCDEF");
fgets(buffer,512,stdin);
snprintf(target,512,buffer);
printf("%s",target);
}
blackbear@blackbear-laptop:~$ gcc prova.c -g
prova.c: In function ‘main’:
prova.c:14: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments
prova.c:14: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments
blackbear@blackbear-laptop:~$ gdb ./a.out -q
Reading symbols from /home/blackbear/a.out...done.
(gdb) break 13
Breakpoint 1 at 0x8048580: file prova.c, line 13.
(gdb) run
Starting program: /home/blackbear/a.out
secret = 0xbffff40c
Breakpoint 1, main () at prova.c:13
13 fgets(buffer,512,stdin);
(gdb) x/10x $esp
0xbfffeff0: 0xbffff00c 0x080486bd 0x00000007 0x00155d7c
0xbffff000: 0x00155d7c 0x000000f0 0x000000f0 0x44434241
0xbffff010: 0x00004645 0x00000004
(gdb)
That's it! In conclusion, we've found the string there because strings are stored on the stack in a reversed way, and the beginning (or the end?) of target is near esp.
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