command:
bigxu@bigxu-ThinkPad-T410 ~/work/lean $ sudo ls
content_shell.pak leanote libgcrypt.so.11 libnotify.so.4 __MACOSX resources
icudtl.dat leanote.png libnode.so locales natives_blob.bin snapshot_blob.bin
most time it is right.but sometimes it is very slow. so i strace it.
command:
bigxu@bigxu-ThinkPad-T410 ~/work/lean $ strace sudo ls
execve("/usr/bin/sudo", ["sudo", "ls"], [/* 66 vars */]) = 0
brk(0) = 0x7f2b3c423000
fcntl(0, F_GETFD) = 0
fcntl(1, F_GETFD) = 0
fcntl(2, F_GETFD) = 0
......
......
......
write(2, "sudo: effective uid is not 0, is"..., 140sudo: effective uid is not 0, is /usr/bin/sudo on a file system with the 'nosuid' option set or an NFS file system without root privileges?
) = 140
exit_group(1) = ?
+++ exited with 1 +++
other information:
bigxu-ThinkPad-T410 lean # ls /etc/sudoers -alht
-r--r----- 1 root root 745 2月 11 2014 /etc/sudoers
bigxu-ThinkPad-T410 lean # ls /usr/bin/sudo -alht
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 152K 12月 14 21:13 /usr/bin/sudo
bigxu-ThinkPad-T410 lean # df `which sudo`
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sdb1 67153528 7502092 56217148 12%
For security reasons, the setuid bit and ptrace (used to run binaries under a debugger) cannot both be honored at the same time. Failure to enforce this restriction in the past led to CVE-2001-1384.
Consequently, any operating system designed with an eye to security will either stop honoring ptrace on exec of a setuid binary, or fail to honor the setuid bit when ptrace is in use.
On Linux, consider using Sysdig instead -- which, being able to only view but not modify behavior, does not run the same risks.
$ sudo strace -u <username> sudo -k <command>
sudo
runs strace
as root.strace
runs sudo
as <username>
passed via the -u
option.sudo
drops cached credentials from the previous sudo
with -k
option (for asking the password again) and runs <command>
.The second sudo
is the tracee (the process being traced).
For automatically putting the current user in the place of <username>
, use $(id -u -n)
.
In addition to this answer by Charles, here is what execve()
manual page says:
If the set-user-ID bit is set on the program file referred to by pathname, then the effective user ID of the calling process is changed to that of the owner of the program file. Similarly, when the set-group-ID bit of the program file is set the effective group ID of the calling process is set to the group of the program file.
The aforementioned transformations of the effective IDs are not performed (i.e., the set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits are ignored) if any of the following is true:
- the no_new_privs attribute is set for the calling thread (see prctl(2));
- the underlying filesystem is mounted nosuid (the MS_NOSUID flag for mount(2)); or
- the calling process is being ptraced.
The capabilities of the program file (see capabilities(7)) are also ignored if any of the above are true.
The permissions for tracing a process, inspecting or modifying its memory, are described in subsection Ptrace access mode checking in section NOTES of ptrace(2) manual page. I've commented about this in this answer.
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