I was just pointed to a very interesting article (archived) about a security problem called Cross Build Injection (XBI). Bascially it is a fancy name for smuggling bad code into an application at build time via automated build systems such as ant, maven or ivy.
The problem could be alleviated by introducing a cryptographic signature validation für dependencies as it is currently in place with many operating systems for downloading packages.
To be clear: I am not talking about simply providing md5 or sha1 hashes for the artifacts. That is already done, but those hashes are stored in the same location as the artifacts. So once a malicious hacker compromises the repository and can replace the artifact they can replace the hashes as well.
So what is acutally needed is some kind of PKI, that allows the developers to sign their artifacts and maven to verify these signatures. Since the signature is done using the private key of the developer it cannot be tampered with when only the repository is compromised.
Does anyone know the state of this in maven?
3.1.groupId – a unique base name of the company or group that created the project. artifactId – a unique name of the project. version – a version of the project. packaging – a packaging method (e.g. WAR/JAR/ZIP)
Usage. In general, we use the dependencyManagement tag to avoid repeating the version and scope tags when we define our dependencies in the dependencies tag. In this way, the required dependency is declared in a central POM file.
runtime This scope indicates that the dependency is not required for compilation, but is for execution. It is in the runtime and test classpaths, but not the compile classpath.
tl;dr:
Non-existent verification mechanisms in Maven and missing language constructs in the POM's DSL are a serious security threat. Until MNG-6026 is addressed, use someting like Gradle Witness.
None of the answers provided so far seem to solve the problem. Signing artifacts is only a first step into the right direction. But the condition when a key used to sign the artifact is considered to be trusted/valid is very opaque. For example: How does pgpverify-maven-plugin or Nexus Professional actually verify that the signature is valid for the artifact? Just retrieving the key from keyserver and verifying the artifact is no enough.
Sonatype mentions this briefly in their blog post:
PGP Signatures: Another Level
On the consumption side, you can use Procurement in Nexus Professional to check for the presence of a signature, and on the publishing side signing your releases with a PGP signature and making PGP signatures available on a public keyserver will help people double-check that artifacts and checksums are consistent. Note: I think there’s more work to be done to create tools that encourage the use of PGP keys and, more importantly, give repository administrators some control over what keys are to be trusted.
(emphasis mine)
What we need is the possibility to model a trust relation from your project or artifact to the declared dependencies. So that, if all involved parties declare such a relation, we are able to create a "chain of trust" from the root (e.g. the project) over its dependencies down to the very last transitive dependency. The Project Object Model (POM) needs to be extended by a <verification/> element for dependencies.
Right now we have something like
<dependency>
<groupId>junit</groupId>
<artifactId>junit</artifactId>
<version>4.0</version>
</dependency>
For hard dependencies, <verfication/> could include the sha256sum of artifact and its POM file:
<dependency>
<groupId>junit</groupId>
<artifactId>junit</artifactId>
<version>4.0</version>
<verification>
<checksum hash='sha-256'>
<pom>[sha256 of junit pom file]</pom>
<artifact>[sha256sum of artifact (junit.jar)]</artifact>
</checksum>
</verification>
</dependency>
If soft or ranged dependencies are used, then we could specify the public key (or multiple) of the keypair used to sign the artifacts
<dependency>
<groupId>junit</groupId>
<artifactId>junit</artifactId>
<version>[4.0,4.5)</version>
<verification>
<openpgp>[secure fingerprint of OpenPGP key]</openpgp>
<!-- possible further 'openpgp' elements in case the artifacts in the
specified version range where signed by multiple keys -->
</verification>
</dependency>
Thanks to peter triggering me, I've raised a feature request for Apache Maven: MNG-6026. Let's see what happens next.
Gradle Witness does something similar for gradle. But it has some disadvantages:
The same seems to be true for the Maven Enforcer Plugin.
pgpverify-maven-plugin appearently also follows this approach. Although documentation is missing there is a test for a so called keysMap
property, which also appears in the config file as keysMapLocation
.
Update: The checksums mentioned below are indeed only for integrity checks and are indeed stored with the artifacts so they don't answer the question.
Actually, one need to sign artifacts using PGP to upload them to a repository that is synced with central (the Maven GPG Plugin can help for this step). To verify signatures at download time, you are invited to use a repository manager supporting this feature. From How to Generate PGP Signatures with Maven:
If you use a tool that downloads artifacts from the Central Maven repository, you need to make sure that you are making an effort to validate that these artifacts have a valid PGP signature that can be verified against a public key server. If you don’t validate signatures, then you have no guarantee that what you are downloading is the original artifact. One way to to verify signatures on artifacts is to use a repository manager like Nexus Professional. In Nexus Professional you can configure the procurement suite to check every downloaded artifact for a valid PGP signature and validate the signature against a public keyserver.
If you are developing software using Maven, you should generate a PGP signature for your releases. Releasing software with valid signatures means that your customers can verify that a software artifact was generated by the original author and that it hasn’t been modified by anyone in transit. Most large OSS forges like the Apache Software Foundation require all projects to be released by a release manager whose key has been signed by other members of the organization, and if you want to synchronize your software artifacts to Maven central you are required to provide pgp signatures.
The Maven Install Plugin can be configured to create integrity checksums (MD5, SHA-1) and you can configure a checksum policy per repository (see checksumPolicy
).
Maven repository managers can/should also be able to deal with them. See for example:
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